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THE CZECH REPUBLIC’S RISK OF
FAILURE TO MEET THE FISCAL
CRITERIA
Jan Bure‰
The unsatisfactory state of public finance in the Czech Republic represents one of the main
problems of the Czech economy. Besides numerous threats associated with the poor state
of public finance, in the European integration process the Czech Republic is facing the risk
that it might fail to meet the Maastricht Fiscal Criteria and that the adoption of a single
currency will be further delayed. The following study aims at outlining how sound the
Czech public finance should be so that we could adopt a common currency. Further, we
would like to identify the main problematic features of the Czech Republic’s public finance
as well as to show ways that reformatory efforts should take so as not to jeopardize the
adoption of the euro.
The Czech fiscal policy is characterized by growing public budget deficits, a relatively low
(but increasing) public debt, and shortcomings in the institutional framework of the
budgeting process. The fiscal projection of the Ministry of Finance shows the growing
public budget balance in Chart 11.
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Chart 1: The development of income, expenditure and the public budget deficit
between 1994 and 2006 (passive scenario). Source: Czech MF
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According to the ESA 95 methodology, the public budget was in deficit throughout the whole
period of 1994-2006. There was no significant growth in the deficit until 2000 (when it went
over 3% of GDP). This is mainly due to the sharp rise in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The
overall tax-to-GDP ratio (including compulsory social and health insurance contributions)
gradually fell until 1998 (38.3% of GDP). It has stagnated since then. Also budget expenditures
related to GDP decreased until 1998 (from 44% to 40% of GDP). Since then there has been a
significant increase each year (with the exception of 2001), and in 2002 budget expenditures
reached 44% again. In an autonomous development scenario the Ministry expects that by 2005
public expenditure will have risen to about 49% of GDP, with a deficit representing about 9%
of GDP. According to this scenario, the public debt would reach 47% of GDP in 2006. The
figures given above clearly show that unless public finance is reformed, the gap between
budget income and expenditure will keep widening and a relatively rapid growth in the public
debt will take place.
This development poses other general risks to the Czech economy. High budget deficits reduce
the amount of savings in the economy and thus primarily limit investment opportunities. As a
result, interest rate growth becomes pressured, and the deficit of the balance of payments
current account grows2. The balance of payments problems can be further aggravated by the
simultaneous decline in the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI)3, which has helped to
balance the current account deficits to a considerable extent. The growing public debt rapidly
increases costs associated with debt management. Moreover, high budget deficits limit efficiency
of automatic stabilizers4 and paralyse possibilities of discretionary fiscal stabilization. Therefore,
sound public finance (i.e. cyclically balanced budgets) is vital for the macroeconomic stability
of any country, and growing public finance deficits are associated with considerable risks.
In the context of the accession (of the Czech Republic and ten other countries) to the EU, further
risks arise from the poor state of public finance. Each of the accessing countries is forming its
own strategy for an optimum timing of the single currency adoption. However, neglecting the
public budget-related problems or underestimating the planned reform might eventually
necessitate postponing the adoption of the euro until more distant future. Also, the Czech
Republic might infringe certain EU regulations (the Stability and Growth Pact5).
Before entering the Monetary Union the accessing countries have to meet what is referred to
as the "convergence criteria" (see Box 1). These criteria should test the particular country’s
readiness for the adoption of a common currency. Although their appropriateness is disputable
from an economic point of view (the criteria remain unchanged largely for political reasons),
the strategy of the Czech economic policy will have to take into account that the criteria have
to be fulfilled according to the common currency adoption schedule.
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Consolidated public debt 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
debt (Czech Consolidation Agency excluded) 27 30,9 36,8 43,4 47,7
Table 1: The development of public debt between 2002 and 2006 (passive scenario).
Source: Czech MF
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Maastricht Convergence Criteria
Exchange rate stability: A Member State has to join the ERM 2 (Exchange Rate
Mechanism), participate in it for at least two years before adopting a single currency,
and remain within a standard fluctuation band without devaluation of currency6.
Public budget deficit: The deficit (measured using the ESA 95 methodology) has to be
below the reference value of 3% of Gross Domestic Product at market prices. This
criterion has to be met the year in which the Czech Republic joins the ERM 2.
Exceptions to this requirement include cases when the ratio has declined substantially
and is approaching the reference value, or, alternatively, when the excess was only
exceptional and temporary.
Public debt: Its amount at market prices (gross total of debts in nominal values at the
end of the year) in relation to Gross Domestic Product at market prices must not exceed
60% of GDP. If this is not the case, the ratio must have sufficiently diminished and must
be approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. This criterion has to be met
the year in which the Czech Republic joins the ERM 2.
Price stability: Within one year the average inflation rate must not exceed by more than
1_ percentage points that of the three best-performing Member States with the lowest
inflation.
Long-term interest rates: A Member State’s average nominal long-term interest rate
(measured according to long-term government bonds) must not exceed by more than
2 percentage points that of the three best-performing Member States with the lowest
inflation rate.
Central bank independence: The country’s legislation must guarantee the independence
of the central bank and stipulate a ban on government financing and providing
advantaged access to loans.
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According to "The Czech Republic’s Strategy for Eurozone Accession", a joint document of the
Czech National Bank, the Czech Ministry of Finance and the Czech Ministry of Industry and
Trade, the euro could be adopted between 2009 and 2010. The Czech National Bank (Dûdek,
2003 etc.) originally defended the earliest possible adoption of a single currency, i.e. in 20077.
Most central banks of the new Members advocate an early adoption, too. The majority of them
will want to adopt the euro at the earliest possible date (see Table 2).
In the Czech Republic there have been lively discussions about when the Eurozone accession
should take place. Those who criticize the adoption of a common currency usually base their
arguments on what is known as the "optimum currency area theory". They stress the necessity
to achieve at least a sufficient degree of harmonization of economic development, mutual
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business interconnection, and a sufficient degree of real and nominal convergence, so that a
single currency would bring minimum risk of asymmetrical shocks or so that there existed
instruments promptly reacting to such a shock (a flexible fiscal policy, a flexible employment
market). The author of this study is one of those who believe that in a small and highly open
economy8, an early adoption of a single currency itself could accelerate the harmonization of
cyclical development, contribute to a greater business interconnection with other economies in
the Eurozone, and support the convergence. Conversely, a euro adoption that takes place much
later than in the other transitional economies could be harmful. Czech exporters would find
themselves at an indisputable disadvantage compared to the other transitional economies,
which may have a negative impact on Czech foreign trade. Further delays in the adoption of
the euro may cause gradual capital outflow and discourage potential investors, who often
consider several transitional economies before placing their investment. Therefore, adopting the
euro significantly later than in the other accessing countries poses definite risk in our opinion.
Before a common currency is adopted, sufficient margin of manoeuvre for fiscal policy must be
created so that the policy has a stabilizing effect during the Czech Republic’s participation in
the ERM 2 as well as after adopting the euro9. We believe that the flexibility and opportunities
of the domestic fiscal policy will decisively influence the speed of Eurozone accession. Meeting
the convergence criteria (i.e. maximum deficit 3% of GDP, maximum public debt 60% of GDP)
at just one point in time is not sufficient. Public finance must be sound enough so as fiscal policy
can replace monetary policy during macroeconomic stabilization. The Ministry of Finance’s
passive scenario10 clearly shows that up until 2006 the Czech Republic may face not only
growing deficits but also a rapidly rising public debt. According to longer-term predictions11,
public debt might reach 58% before 2009. The Ministry decided to remedy this adverse situation
by trying to reform public finance. The success and thoroughness of the reform will probably
– and to a considerable extent – affect the Czech Republic’s ability to adopt a single currency.
However, the other new Members struggle with public finance-related problems, too. Their
accession strategy related to how they plan to meet the fiscal criteria is shown in the following
table. The deficits and public debts for 2006 are not predicted according to passive scenarios –
they already take into account the governments’ active measures.
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Table 2: Accession strategies and public finance. Source: PEP (2003), Ministries of
Finance of Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic, Šaroch (2003)
country
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Estonia
accession
strategy
2009 - 2010
2008
2008 - 2009
2007 - 2008
2007
2007
public finance
deficit in 2003/2006
(% of GDP, ESA 95)
-6,3 % / -4 %
-4,9 % / -2,5 %
-4,8 % / -3,3 %
-5,3 % / -3,3 %
-1,27 % / -0,7 %
-0,5 % / -1 %
public debt in
2003/2006 
(% of GDP, ESA 95)
19,5 % /  36,7 %
55% / 49 %
44,3 % / 58,7 %
33,2 % / 00 %
26% / 24 %
5,5 % / 3,1 %
meeting the fiscal
criteria
2008
2006
2007
2006
2004
2004
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Underestimation of the public finance reform may lead to a significant delay in adopting a
common currency. It is important to start – as soon as possible – a reform on both the
expenditure and the revenue side that will result in a long-term stability of public budgets and
that will create sufficient margin of manoeuvre for a stabilizing fiscal policy. The measures taken
as part of this reform should not jeopardize the process of real convergence12. In the following
paragraphs we will look at the roots of the Czech Republic’s budgetary problems and evaluate
sufficiency of the proposed measures from the perspective of future improvements in the
flexibility of budgeting in the Czech Republic.
Reforms: the revenue side and the expenditure side
The main reason for the growing deficit is growth in public expenditure in relation to GDP (see
Chart 1) while the revenues-to-GDP ratio is stagnating. A more detailed analysis reveals the
following:
1) Deficits grow especially due to the worsening state budget balance
This fact is well-evidenced by the data presented in the following table:
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Table 3: Public budgets (balance according to GFS MMF methodology, in CZK
billions). Source: Czech National Bank
1999 2000 2001 2002
state budget -29,6 -46,1 -67,7 -45,7 
local budget 18,5 -2,5 -11,2 -4,3 
public financial assets -5,2 -5,7 . .
state funds -0,6 2,6 11,2 12,3 
the Land Fund -0,3 -0,5 -0,1 -0,5 
the National Property Fund 2,9 -11,5 13,2 28,4 
health insurance companies 2,5 2,1 1,4 -1,2 
others 0,7 -0,4 0,9 -0,8 
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What we can consider as transformation costs are extra costs in the form of subsidies provided
to "transformational institutions"13 minus extra revenues from privatisation. Public budget deficits
do not grow due to transformation costs, as revenues from privatisation have always (with the
exception of 1998) exceeded the subsidies provided to transformational institutions. The fact
that public budget deficits rise due to other factors is illustrated in Chart 1, in which the deficit
is cleared of extra revenues and costs.
On the other hand, these figures cannot be presented as very optimistic. Through the
transformational institutions a lot of non-standard operations were done by which the
government realized its fiscal policy so that it is not reflected in the current public budget
balance. This resulted in an accumulation of hidden debt in these institutions, which sooner or
later will get reflected in the balance of the public budget. Besides the hidden debt of the
transformational institutions, significant risks are posed also by the high amount of provided
governmental guarantees (Czech Railways, IPB). The overall volume of non-budgetary
obligations and guarantees (in relation to GDP) compared to the actual ratio14 of gross public
debt to GDP is well illustrated in the following table.
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2) The deficit does not grow due to transformation costs 
Table 4: Extra public budget revenues and expenditures. Source: Czech MF (public
finance reform conception)
Table 5: The state’s non-budgetary obligations and guarantees. Source: OECD
Privatisation TI subsidies Difference (privatis.-TI)CZK billions
1993 26.3 0.0 26.3
1994 31.7 0.0 31.7
1995 27.1 3.4 23.7
1996 25.7 11.1 14.6
1997 13.8 11.6 2.2
1998 15.5 18.4 -2.9
1999 26.0 7.6 18.4
2000 20.5 20.1 0.4
2001 59.9 51.1 8.8
2002 126.6 64.0 62.6
TOTAL 373.1 187.3 185.8
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
9,7 7,9 8,3 11,4 11,9 14 14,2 18,9
17,6 15,3 13,2 12,9 13,0 14,5 16,7 18,7
non-budgetary
obligations and
guarantees (% of GDP)
gross public debt 
(% of GDP)
THE CZECH REPUBLIC’S RISK OF FAILURE TO MEET THE FISCAL CRITERIA
In order to cover the hidden liabilities, other one-off revenues from privatisation will have to
be used in the future. This, unfortunately, limits the possibility to use the privatisation revenues
for system changes (such as a thorough reform of the pension system).
What can be seen as positive in this regard are the measures proposed within the public finance
reform conception, namely: the government’s pledge not to transfer new bad assets to the
Czech Consolidation Agency15, to accelerate closedown of the transformational institutions, and
to create reserves (according to the degree of risk) for both former and new guarantees.
3) The increase in expenditure is pushed especially by the growth in
mandatory16 and quasi-mandatory expenditures17
Mandatory expenditures are either given by law, or they result from other more or less fixed
state obligations. The high amount of these expenditures to a great extent hinders the
manoeuvrability of the public budget expenditure policy. At present mandatory expenditures
represent 55% of the overall state budget expenditure; any further growth in this percentage
will cause a (roughly) half-percent increase in the overall expenditure. Together with quasi-
mandatory expenditures they represent no less than 81.4% of the total state budget expenditure.
Table 2 shows the most significant mandatory expenditure components and how they have
grown so far. It is evident that social transfers constitute the highest proportion. As the
proportion of these transfers to the state budget is quite high, they greatly contribute to the
growth in its expenditure.
47
Table 6: Mandatory expenditures. Source: OECD, calculations done by the author
Component
Mandatory expenditures given by
law; of which:
- social transfers18
- state contributions to the health
insurance system
- debt service
- building savings contributions
- other mandatory expenditures
given by law
Other mandatory expenditures
(especially those associated with
state guarantees and loans)
Quasi-mandatory expenditures;
of which:
- the army
- public administration salaries
Other state budget expenditures
Overall state budget expenditure
Proportion in the
state budget
(2003)
50,40 %
40,40 %
4,00 %
2,90 %
1,60 %
1,50 %
2,03 %
25,23 %
5,90 %
16,40 %
22,34 %
100,00 %
Growth
(1997-2003)
55,50 %
54,00 %
75,50 %
33,00 %
236,80 %
20,40 %
158,70 %
70,80 %
65,50 %
44,30 %
9, 00 %
46,01 %
Contribution to the
overall increase in state
budget expenditure 
(1997-2003)
26,27 %
20,71 %
2,53 %
1,06 %
1,64 %
0,36 %
1,82 %
15,28 %
3,38 %
7,17 % 
2,69 %
46,01 %
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Between 1997-2003 the overall state budget expenditure increased by 46 percent. Mandatory
expenditures contributed to this increase by roughly 28 percent. Social transfers alone made up
about 21 percent of the overall increase in public expenditure19. 
There was an enormous growth in building savings contributions and expenditures associated
with state guarantees and loans20. The state’s contributions to the health insurance system have
been growing considerably, too. Quasi-mandatory expenditures (the largest part of which is
constituted by defence spending and public administration salaries) further contribute to the
overall growth in expenditure by 15 percent21.
Therefore, budgeting problems were primarily caused by growth in budget expenditure, which
results from growth in mandatory and quasi-mandatory expenditures. Their increase limits the
flexibility of budget management and, accordingly, lowers the capacity to act as a stabilizing
factor when a common currency has been adopted. A seriously taken reform aimed at bringing
long-term stabilization of public finance should therefore be oriented towards, above all,
lowering the proportion of the budget’s mandatory and quasi-mandatory expenditures. Areas
greatly contributing to the growth in expenditure should be the main focus of attention; these
include expenditures that represent a high proportion of the overall expenditure and that have
increased in recent years, i.e. social transfers (the pension system, social security payments, sick
benefits) and public administration salaries. Other significantly growing expenditures should be
observed, too: building savings contributions, expenditures associated with state guarantees and
loans, and the growing state contributions to the health insurance system.
The government’s public finance reform also declares that measures regarding the expenditure
side should prevail. The reform is divided into two stages. In the first stage (up to 2006) 60-75%
of all expenditure-related measures will be adopted so that the overall public budget deficit22
goes down below 4% of GDP23. The individual measures regarding the expenditure side and
their impact on the state budget are summarized in the following table.
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Table 7: Measures regarding the expenditure side. Source: Czech MF
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Of the proposed measures, the greatest effect is expected from the additional cuts, lowering the
number of employees in centrally-governed public services (34.9% of the overall effect), and
changes concerning sick benefit payments (11.8% of the overall effect). As other measures
(lowering the debt service expenditure excluded24) will in three years’ time bring less than 17%
of the overall effect, we can consider the above-mentioned measures as the key expenditure-
related measures in the first stage of the public finance reform. What can be seen as positive
are the efforts to lower the number of employees in centrally-governed public services by
means of personnel and organizational audits. Salaries in the public administration sphere
constitute a considerable proportion of the quasi-mandatory expenditures (see Table 4).
Lowering the amount of these salaries – through rationalization and improvements in the
efficiency of public authorities – is a change that could bring long-term savings. On the other
hand, changes in the system of sick benefit payments (which will bring the second most
significant effect) are of parametric nature25, and it does not seem that they could considerably
and in the long term contribute to the lowering of mandatory expenditures. The additional cuts,
by which the government achieved 35.7% of all savings, came "in the last moment" and are not
coupled with more significant system changes.
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active expenditure-related measures
pensions – parametric changes
pensions – revaluation speed
sick benefits
social security payments
social benefits
building savings
Introduction of a 16-grade salary system 
and a drop in the number of employees in
state organizational components (SOC) by 
2% a year
salaries – moratorium on increasing the
number of jobs in central SOC
salaries – freezing state officials’ salaries at
the 2003 level
salaries - education
drop in expenditure on debt service with a
lower deficit
additional cuts (defence, research and
development, subsidies provided to
companies etc.)
active expenditure-related measures 
(sum total)
overall fiscal impact
on the state budget
(2003-2006), 
CZK billions 
-0,2
8,6
22,2
1,3
1,7
1,2
65,9
2,4
0,3
4,5
13,6
67,4
188,9
overall fiscal impact
on the state budget
(2004-2006),
percent
-0,1 %
4,5 %
11,8 %
0,7 %
0,9 %
0,6 %
34,9 %
1,3 %
0,2 %
2,4 %
7,2 %
35,7 %
100 %
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The measures to be taken in the first stage of the reform lack more radical system changes. The
government’s document itself mentions them but only in the sense that they will take place in
the future. These changes should include, above all, reforms in areas that increase the
proportion of social transfers, namely: a radical reform of the pension system (to be prepared
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, see Box 2), a thorough reform of the health
insurance system26, and changes in the social security system27.
Public budgets struggle with a long-term problem of the ageing
population, which causes growth in pension system expenditure28
The structure of social transfers and its development is illustrated in Chart 2, which
shows the absolute growth (in CZK billions) broken into the individual components.
Within the social transfers, pension payments constitute the highest proportion (70% in
2003); they also greatly contribute to the state budget expenditure (28% in 2003)29. If the
current pension system is maintained, its deficit will burden the state budget more and
more. The development of the pension system revenue and expenditure30 is shown in
Table 8. Unless the system parameters are modified the debt may become difficult to
control.
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Chart 2: Social transfers. Source: OECD
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Modification of the system parameters provides certain chances; this modification
includes: increasing the retirement age, changes in the indexation of payments, and
changes in the contribution rate. However, in the long-term perspective the combination
of parametric measures appears to be difficult to put through and (taking into account
other objectives of the economic policy) unrealistic. A considerable increase in the
retirement age, a significant drop in pensions in proportion to wages and salaries, or an
increase in the already quite high pension contribution can, on the one hand, ensure
long-term stabilization of the pension system from the macroeconomic point of view.
On the other hand it is evident that with the current demographic trend, such parametric
changes could have a negative impact on the inhabitants’ financial situation: they would
pay even more in their productive years and receive even less when retired31. Therefore
it will be necessary, sooner or later, to reform the existing system more thoroughly (to
base it upon more pillars). According to international experience, turning the existing
system into a system partly based on pension funds32 is very costly and is, therefore,
associated with temporary excess deficits of the state budget. Postponing these
fundamental reforms until considerably later could jeopardize the fulfilment of the
Maastricht criteria and/or result in breaking the current rules of the Stability and Growth
Pact33 and subsequent sanctions34.
4) There are not many opportunities to perform the public finance
reform through the revenue side
There is not enough room for increasing the tax-to-GDP ratio. The proportion of taxes
and social security contributions35 to the public budget revenue is decisive, and thus a
reform focused on increasing the ratio of state budget revenue to GDP is not really
practicable. The overall tax-to-GDP ratio (including compulsory social and health
insurance contributions) is relatively low when compared with more developed EU
countries but too high in comparison with countries at the same level (see Table 9). The
high taxation hinders the development of the private sector to a great extent. Further,
countries at a lower level of economic development compete against each other for
foreign investments, which support real convergence. High taxation puts foreign
investors of36.
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Table 8: Pension system revenue and expenditure. Source: Bezděk 2000, Czech
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
year revenue expenditure balance
1996 133,9 129,5 4,4
1997 146,3 152,8 -6,5
1998 156,3 168,8 -12,5
1999 161,8 181,3 -19,5
2000 170,0 186,8 -16,4
2001 186,0 201,0 -15,0
2002 192,3 209,9 -17,6
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Table 9: Tax-to-GDP ratio in 2000. Source: Czech MF and OECD
Denmark 56 %
Sweden 55.6 %
Austria 46.7 %
Czech Republic 39.40 %
Hungary 39.10 %
Greece 37.80 %
Slovakia 35.80 %
Switzerland 35.70 %
Spain 35.20 %
Portugal 34.50 %
Poland 34.10 %
Ireland 31.10 %
EU 15 41.60 %
OECD 37.40 %
For the reasons given above we believe that a reform that would lead to increasing the tax-to-
GDP ratio could be dangerous and might jeopardize the process of real convergence in the
future. Moreover, such a reform does not primarily address the source of the country’s budgeting
problems, which is on the expenditure side.
The revenue-related measures of the government’s reform scenario are expected to improve the
revenue side of the budget by about 63 billion CZK between 2004 and 2006. The main factor
contributing to this increase is the harmonization with the EC legislation in the field of excise
taxes37 and VAT38. Measures concerning the VAT will bring the most significant effect. According
to EU standards, certain goods and services that used to be taxed at a reduced rate have to be
taxed at the standard rate now. However, as the difference between the standard and the
reduced rate of VAT is bigger compared with any country in the EU, the standard rate will have
to go down gradually. The government has so far lowered the standard rate to 19% for the time
being; however, there is a possibility to lower the rate even further39. Therefore, effects on the
public budgets balance resulting from changes in the VAT should be taken as temporary and
not regarded as a systematic solution of the problem.
Even when seen from other perspectives, there is more room for lowering than for increasing
on the revenue side. Taking into account the high tax competition as regards the corporate
income tax, we believe that the tax rate should be lowered40. It is often possible to achieve
greater revenue by lower taxation (Luxembourg, Ireland) than the other way round. There are
opinions that tax competition will contribute to a gradual elimination of this tax. In the context
of the EU, the Czech Republic unfortunately occupies the first place in the proportion of social
and health insurance (44%) to the overall revenue from taxation and insurance payments. Here,
too, the burden should be lowered rather than increased.
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Due to the reasons given above we believe that measures regarding the revenue side are –
along with the necessary synchronization with EU legislation – motivated especially by efforts
to temporarily fill the gaps in the budget. Significant changes on the expenditure side should
take place from the very beginning of the reform, so that the overall tax-to-GDP ratio can be
lowered in the long run.
Reforms in the preparation, implementation and assessment of the state
budget
A long-term balanced budget management needs a transparent framework for budget
preparation, implementation and assessment. Above all, the system should include longer-term
aspects of budgeting and natural limits to annual growth in expenditure, which could
experience one-off political pressure. Without sufficient limits, short-sighted political behaviour
could jeopardize completion of long-term economic policy objectives. This includes the
fulfilment of the fiscal criteria, and the overall ability of the fiscal policy to act as a stabilizing
factor when a common currency has been adopted.
During most of the 1990s the governments prepared budgets without a conception, from year
to year, without any long-term outlook. The considerable lack of transparency in budget
management (given especially by a large number of extra-budgetary funds and by the existence
of the transformational institutions) has logically pushed the growth in the overall expenditure,
and has made the expenditure less effective. If the Czech Republic wants to joint the Eurozone,
the fiscal policy framework will have to be made more transparent and controlled by better-
defined rules. It is necessary to stop preparing the budget without a conception, in a haphazard
fashion. Rather, annual budgets should automatically result from an approved medium-term
strategy of the governmental fiscal policy.
The government’s public finance reform tries to introduce the principle of fiscal targeting into
the budgeting process. This principle should make the current as well as the future government
think about its revenue and expenditure from a medium-term perspective. Thus, parliamentary
discussions should change focus from one-year planning to conception-based multi-year budget
preparation. The government will, first, determine a target public budget deficit41 as a percentage
proportion to Gross Domestic Product, for the following three years’ period. Then it will prepare
an autonomous fiscal outlook scenario42, based on a conservative macroeconomic forecast. In
reaction to this scenario, the Finance Minister may propose various measures regarding the
revenue or the expenditure side. Having considered these measures, the government will
determine an obligatory medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) based on a projection
of budget revenues and on the given target deficit. This framework will provide an obligatory
limit to government spending for each year of the respective three-year period. It is the central
government’s MTEF that will be subject to legislative approval together with the state budget,
not the proportion of the public finance deficit to GDP. Annual budgets will be derived from
the MTEF. In connection with the fulfilment of the Maastricht fiscal criteria and future adherence
to the Stability and Growth Pact rules, fiscal targeting can turn out to be a relatively powerful
weapon: it will force governments to prepare their budget strategies well in advance so as to
avoid excess deficits.
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On the other hand, the proposed solution bears certain risks. These include, above all, the
quality of the macroeconomic forecast. If the real growth is lower than expected, the overall
budget revenue is lower while the amount of the government’s aggregate expenditure is given
by the plan. Therefore the absolute deficit is higher. And as GDP is lower than expected, the
deficit-to-GDP ratio significantly rises. While the government does not commit itself to targeting
the deficit-to-GDP ratio43 and targets the obligatory MTEF instead, there exists a risk that future
growth will be overestimated. Although the government manages to stay within the expenditure
limit, the planned deficit-to-GDP ratio will be greatly exceeded. Therefore, taking into account
the key role of the macroeconomic forecast, the question remains whether the economy’s future
growth should be analysed by an independent institution, in order to prevent pressures towards
overestimation of the growth44.
We endorse the efforts to lay stress on performance-oriented budgeting (dividing the MTEF into
individual chapters), i.e. efforts to make particular officials and chapter administrators more
interested in achieving particular outputs in an efficient and economical way. This principle
(where on the one hand the officials need to get more freedom to make decisions regarding
the means and particular inputs, on the other hand accurate measuring systems for assessing
their outputs have to be introduced) is mentioned in the OECD best practices, for example. The
fundamental problem of this approach is how to choose suitable measuring systems45. It is also
necessary to give chapter administrators enough freedom so that they are able to achieve the
given outputs. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that they are really motivated to seek
savings while performing expenditure audits46. According to the draft of the reform, the
Parliament should not influence the division of the MTEF into chapters. This is important: the
Parliament is expected to review the medium-term aggregate expenditure framework only; the
division into chapters will be eventually determined by the government. This, on the one hand,
gives lobby groups few opportunities to further increase budget expenditure through the
Parliament. On the other hand it makes the government more responsible for means allotment
based on an audit of the individual program activities and for the assessment of performance
based on the given measuring systems.
The new regulation of the state budget’s institutional framework should definitely support
conception-based budgeting in the Czech Republic. Whether it will eventually result in further
savings in government spending and in the fulfilment of the fiscal criteria will depend especially
on the government’s ability to perform radical reforms within a fiscal targeting framework, to
make accurate macroeconomic forecasts, and to remain within the given expenditure limits. At
any rate, an indisputable advantage of the new system is that it will transparently show the
existing problems.
Conclusions
• Public finance in the Czech Republic is characterized by growing public budget
deficits and a relatively low (but rapidly increasing) public debt. As this
development poses a number of general risks, the government will have to
begin the public finance reform at all events. The reasons for a quick
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consolidation of public finance include the Czech Republic’s accession to the
European Union and the strategy for joining the Eurozone. It is necessary to
not only meet the Maastricht Fiscal Criteria but also to reform public finance
thoroughly enough so that the fiscal policy performs a stabilizing function
during the participation in ERM 2 and after adopting the euro. Unless sufficient
fiscal consolidation takes place there is a risk that the adoption of a common
currency will be postponed further into the future. We believe that a euro
adoption that would take place much later than in the other transitional
economies could be dangerous for the Czech Republic. 
• The unfortunate state of public finance does not result from transformation
costs (subsidies provided to transformational institutions minus revenues from
privatisation). On the other hand, the state’s non-budgetary obligations in the
Consolidation Agency should not be underestimated. A large proportion of
these obligations will have to be paid off using the remaining privatisation
revenues; therefore, it will not be possible to use all of these revenues for
system reforms.
• The budgeting problems exist largely due to the growth in the proportion of
state budget expenditure to GDP. This growth is pushed by the increase in
mandatory and quasi-mandatory expenditures. Their increase limits the
flexibility of budget management and, to a considerable extent, lowers the
fiscal policy’s capacity to act as a stabilizing factor after joining the EMU. Social
transfers (the pension system, social security payments, sick benefits) made the
greatest contribution to the overall growth in expenditure, especially between
1997-2003. The reform efforts should focus, in particular, on these transfers.
Unfortunately, the draft of the first stage of the public finance reform lacks
more radical reforms of the pension system and of the social security payments.
Such radical changes are expected to take place in the second stage of the
reform.
• There are not many opportunities to perform the public finance reform through
the revenue side The Czech Republic has the highest tax-to-GDP ratio of the
newly accessing countries. Further rise in this ratio could jeopardize the process
of real convergence. The main reform measures regarding the revenue side of
the budget are connected with the synchronization of legislation in the area of
VAT and excise taxes. A slight decrease in the corporate income tax rate is
expected to result in a decline in revenue. Taking into account the fact that
company taxation in the EU faces considerable tax competition, there is room
for further decline in the corporate income tax rate. Lowering the proportion
of social and health insurance to the overall amount of tax and insurance
payments would also be desirable, as this proportion is higher than in any
country of the EU. This would, however, require the above-mentioned system
changes on the expenditure side to take place as well. In the long term, the
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consolidated tax-to-GDP ratio should decrease to a certain extent rather than
grow. A reform focusing on the revenue side only would, moreover, disregard
the real source of the current budgeting problems.
• Until today the budgeting process in the Czech Republic has lacked long-term
aspects and fixed limits for the public budget. The lack of limits could result in
politicised decisions to increase expenditure unnecessarily. This also poses the
risk that in the medium term the government will not be able to implement its
economic policy priorities. One of these priorities is the Eurozone accession,
connected with fulfilment of the fiscal criteria. The principle of fiscal targeting
will introduce an obligatory medium-term limit into the budgeting process; this
will probably support a more conception-based approach to budgeting.
However, the particular successes as regards long-term savings and lowering
deficits will greatly depend on how radical the government’s reforms will be.
Notes
1 The fiscal projection works with estimations of deficits measured using the ESA 95
methodology, which is close to the current budget concept. As the Czech Statistical Office
publishes the deficits according to the ESA 95 with a considerable delay, the Ministry of
Finance uses estimations. It is the methodology used for assessing the fulfilment of the fiscal
criteria.
2 We consider only a partial effect of Ricardian equivalence in transitional economies, i.e. the
decline in governmental savings is only partly compensated by an equivalent growth in
private savings.
3 Further, a greater outflow of revenues can be expected.
4 It can hardly be assumed that with a decline in economy, increase in the already quite high
deficit will have a stabilizing effect on the output. Lower confidence and higher interest rates
will exceed impacts of the expenditure multiplier.
5 Although the Commission cannot impose sanctions on the Member States that have not
adopted a common currency yet, negative assessment could influence the Czech Republic’s
future position in negotiations regarding the adoption of a common currency. On the other
hand, the question is to what extent the current rules of the Pact will remain valid in the
future.
6 Central parity is not necessarily unchangeable, and ECOFIN can modify it following the
Commission’s proposal. Also, going beyond the fluctuation band does not necessarily mean
breach of the exchange rate criterion. The final judgement will be given by the ECOFIN,
which will probably decide after considering the extent and length of the deviation.
7 However, at that time it was not completely clear how radical a reform we can expect.
8 With a significant share of trade with the other Members.
9 See for example Mandel, Tom_ík (2003), D_dek (2003), or The Czech Republic’s Strategy
for Eurozone Accession (2003). Most authors agree that the fiscal policy will be of key
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importance especially during the ERM 2 participation and in the first years after adopting the
euro. With growing harmonization of economic development the risk of asymmetrical shocks
should decline.
10 See Chart 1 and Table 1.
11 In its strategy the Ministry of Finance provides estimation up to 2006 only. A longer-term
forecast was prepared for example by Patria Finance; available on:
http://www.patria.cz/generated/ek_analyza/Budoucnost_verejneho_dluhu.pdf
12 Here we refer to, in particular, measures regarding the revenue side.
13 The Czech Consolidation Agency financial group and _eská inkasní.
14 At present the public debt is shown including CCA obligations.
15 Starting already from 2004.
16 Mandatory expenditures are expenditures that result from laws, other legal regulations and
the state’s contractual obligations. For instance: social transfers, pension scheme payments,
building savings, health insurance contributions, debt service and guarantees.
17 Above all, defence spending and salaries for public administration employees.
18 The concept of social transfers is different than according to the ESA 95 methodology. Here
they are given without education spending and the overall health service expenditure;
besides, the figures include contributions to the building savings system.
19 See Box 2 for details concerning the growth in social transfers.
20 Nevertheless, due to its small share in the overall budget expenditure, the enormous growth
in building savings contributions does not have too serious an impact on the overall budget
management.
21 The excess amount of quasi-mandatory expenditures could result from inefficient and
uneconomical performance of the public administration sphere (non-transparent public
procurement practices, over-employment).
22 State budget + state funds + health insurance companies’ budgets + municipal and regional
budgets – revenues from privatisation and transformational institutions’ expenses.
23 From this figure all respective expenditure limits for the central government’s budget and
the state budget are derived.
24 We believe that this cannot be considered as an active expenditure-related measure in the
proper sense of the word, as it automatically ensues from the adopted measures, both
expenditure- and revenue-related. By saying this we do not want to downgrade the
importance of this factor. We merely want to note that it is a positive result of a reform rather
than the reform itself.
25 A moratorium on increase in reduction limits, prolongation of the period in which the
assessment basis is determined, reduction of the assessment basis during the first 14 days of
the sick leave, and reduction of the daily allowance for the first three days of the sick leave.
26 The reform scenario plans to start a more radical reform in 2005.
27 A more radical reform to be started in 2006.
28 Not only the pension system expenditure but also the state contributions to the health
insurance system.
29 Due to the great proportion of pension payments (28% of the overall state budget
expenditure, 70% of all social transfers), their increase has contributed to the growth in social
transfers to the greatest extent.
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30 Due to the great proportion of pension payments (28% of the overall state budget
expenditure, 70% of all social transfers), their increase has contributed to the growth in social
transfers to the greatest extent.
31 The actual calculations see for example Bezd_k (2000).
32 The aim of this text is not to analyse the options of a pension system selection. The
important thing is that the transition to a system in which people partly save (either on an
obligatory or a voluntary basis) for their retirement is associated with short-term higher costs
and long-term savings.
33 It is known that the current rules of the Pact do not provide the Member States with
opportunities for more radical budget reforms (a reform of the pension system) connected
with temporarily higher deficits.
34 The current government has plans for the pension system reform. Although exact details
have not been specified, the new system will probably be based on the Swedish model. The
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs will prepare a draft, which is expected to be submitted
for approval in 2005; changes should take place after 2010. (Details: Kopeck_, Josef. "Vláda:
Nové penze _ekají _ty_icátníky. (The Government: New pensions for today’s 40-year-olds)".
Hospodá_ské noviny. 19 November 2003).
35 In the Czech Republic the share of social security contributions in GDP is exceptionally high.
36 Foreign investors are discouraged by, in particular, the high taxation of corporate income
(lowers after-tax profit) and the high taxation of labour (increases labour costs). A current
example is the decision of the car manufacturer Hyundai Motor. For its investment of 1.5
billion dollars, the company gave preference to Poland and Slovakia. One of the main
reasons was the higher tax burden in the Czech Republic.
37 Excise tax-related measures are relatively well-defined by European requirements, so the
margin of manoeuvre is quite narrow in this respect.
38 Transfer of certain goods and services from the reduced rate to the standard rate range;
lowering of the minimum turnover limit needed for VAT registration.
39 It is theoretically possible to lower the rate of VAT from the current 22% to 15%. According
to many experts, high VAT rates result in greater tax evasion.
40 There are plans to gradually lower the corporate income tax from the current 31% to 24%
before 1 January 2006.
41 According to the draft of the reform, the target should be determined for the deficit in a
broader sense (however, this target would be less obligatory) as well as for the deficit in a
narrower sense (state budget and state funds), which would be obligatory to a greater extent.
42 The autonomous fiscal scenario should be based on the existing legal and institutional
environment.
43 The government actually cannot do this because in many cases the fiscal policy could have
a significant procyclical effect.
44 In the Netherlands, the amount of aggregate expenditure is targeted in the medium term,
too. The analysis of the future economic development is done by the independent CPB
(Central Planning Bureau), which presents the government with two scenarios of the future
economic development. One of them tries to provide the best estimate of the real economic
development, the other scenario takes into account possible risks of growth overestimation
(therefore, its predictions are generally closer to reality).
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45 The good old management rule "what you measure, you manage" applies here. The draft
of the reform plans to trace either outputs (processed applications, closed legal cases,
frequency of inspections) or effects (lower road accident frequency, decrease in criminal
behaviour, etc.).
46 The government’s public budget reform conception plans to establish a system in which
administrators who find savings do not receive reduced financial means from the budget. The
system will also allow transferring means to other effective programmes. On the other hand,
administrators who show uneconomical behaviour will obtain less money. The question
remains, to what extent will this approach be applied in practice? The questionnaire-based
"expenditure audits" that took place in the first half of 2003 showed that the officials tend to
ask for more financial means and disregard the requirements of economy and efficiency by
adopting formal measures. It was also shown that they are unable to set priorities as regards
performance-oriented budgeting. Therefore, a change from institutional financing to
performance-oriented financing seems to be a long-term issue.
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